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EVALUATION:1
WHERE ARE WE? WHERE ARE WE GOING?
by Ronnie A. Yoder
Federal ALJs have enjoyed nearly 50 years of evaluation-free performance
under the APA. Freedom from evaluation by the ALJs' employing agency has always
been seen as inherent in the APA structure, which contemplates ALJ hearing officers
serving within the individual agencies free from the supervision of enforcement and
investigatory officers and free from evaluations. The APA provides that an ALJ may not
be "responsible to or subject to the supervision or direction of an employee or agent
engaged in the purpose of investigating or prosecuting function of an agency." 5 U.S.C.
§ 554d)(2).
The APA also establishes an elaborate structure for performance appraisals
forfederal employees (5 U.S.C. § 4302)2 and specifically excludes federal administrative
law judges from those procedures. (5 U.S.C. § 4301 (2) (D). Congress specifically
intended to ensure that ALJs were not subject to performance appraisals by the
agencies where they work. S Rep. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess 29 (1945) reprinted
in Administrative Procedure Act Legislative History, 1944-46 S. Doc. No. 248, 79th
Cong., 233 (1946). In 1978 the Civil Service Reform Act again reaffirmed the APA's
prohibition against performance appraisals of ALJs. Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111
(1978). See L. Hope O'Keefe, Note Administrative Law Judges, Performance Evaluation
and Production Standards: Judicial Independence Versus Employee Accountability, 54
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 591 (1986). AU pay has historically been prescribed by [OPM]
1 This article was originally presented by Administrative Law Judge Ronnie A. Yoder,
now Chair of the ABA's National Conference of Administrative Law Judges, at its 19th Annual
Symposium, April 8, 1994, in Washington, D.C., on "Discipline and Complaint Procedures for
Federal and State Administrative Law Judges-Past, Present, and Future." The views expressed
are those of the author and not those of any agency or organization. The article has been updated
to reflect subsequent developments.
2 5 U.S.C. § 4313 state that SES performance appraisals are to be "based on both
individual agency head performance taking into account such factors as-(1) improvements in
efficiency, productivity, and quality of work or service, including any significant reduction in
paperwork; (2) cost efficiency; (3) timeliness of performance; (4) other indications of the
effectiveness, productivity, and performance quality of the employees from whom the senior
executive is responsible; and (5) meeting affirmative action goals and achievement of [EEO]
requirements."
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independently of agency recommendations or ratings. 3 Step increases have been given
without the certification required for other employees that their work is of an acceptable
level of competence. 4 Under the new ALJ pay system, pay for ALJs (other than some
Chiefs or Associate Chiefs in AL-1 and 2) is tied to a specific schedule of pay levels
within AL-3 based solely upon years of service.
5
What then has happened that we should concern ourselves with the question
of evaluating ALJs:
1. pressure generally for evaluation of government employees and judges
in particular;
2. the move to central panels at the State level where evaluations of ALJs
for pay and retention is practiced;
3. the move to ALJ Corps at the federal level where evaluations might be
permitted;
4. regulatory reform and ABA support for evaluation outside the
employing agency;
5. the GAO Report questioning discrimination by SSA ALJs;
6
6. the Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force Preliminary Report (Decision
Draft) (July 1992) pp. 93-103 (gender bias issues related to disability
benefits determinations);
7. the ACUS Report; and
8. the proposals of the ABA Administrative Law Section.
Let's look at a few of those developments.
3 5 U.S.C. § 5372, repealed by Pub. L. by Pub. L, No. 101-590, Title I, § 104(a)(1), No. 5, 1990,104
Stat. 1445.
4 5 U.S.C. § 5335 (1988), prior to amendment by Pub. L. No. 101 -590.
5 5. U.S.C. § 553; 5 C.F.R. Parts 591 and 930.
6 Social Security: Racial Difference in Disability Decision Warrants Further Investigation, GAO/HRD-
92-56 (April 1992).
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A. ABA POSITION
In 1979 the ABA adopted a position endorsing periodic performance evaluations
by someone outside the employing agency.
"The Association supports legislative action which would, with respect to the appointment
and tenure of administrative law judges (ALJs):
"(A)Create a system of periodic performance evaluations by
an Administrator outside the employing agency, under
standards of performance to be promulgated by the
Administrator with the approval of a review board
composed of a majority of ALJs (excluding chief ALJs)
and others, but no individuals from the agency that
employs the ALJ under review or who regularly litigate
before that agency. Such evaluations may lead to the
filing of a complaint by the Administrator before the
Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) seeking
removal or other sanction of ALJs whose performance
is found unacceptable by MSPB after a hearing on the
record; provided that before any such complaint is filed
(1) the accused judge is given written notice of the basis
of the complaint and an opportunity to appear before
the review board and (2) a majority of the review board
has voted to file such complaint."
That position grew out of the pressure arising from regulatory reform, where we
successfully resisted legislation for terms of years and evaluation of ALJs for performance
and retention. Regulatory Reform proposals provided for a fixed term of office and
performance evaluation of ALJs by ACUS or OPM. D.262, 96h Cong., 1st Sess., §
209(b)(1)(1 980) (ACUS panels of ALJs from agencies other than the ALJ under review);
H.R. 6768, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) (presidentially appointed Performance Review
Board). Subsequent to the initial ABA position various states adopted central panels of
ALJs where terms of years and evaluations are in place.
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B. CENTRAL PANEL DEVELOPMENTS
The ACUS Report on "the Federal Administrative Judiciary (August 1992)" (p.
161) referred extensively to evaluation for federal and state judges and state central
panel ALJs:
"Whether or not they follow the ABA Guidelines, judicial
evaluation programs are increasingly being used at the state
level. According to the latest survey of state activity, 'six states
and the courts of the Navajo Nation operate judicial evaluation
programs, and eight states are actively developing a program or
are close to implementing one.' 7(n 1267) Among the stated purposes
of some of these programs is to generate information to be used
in judicial retention elections or in reappointment decisions.
"The federal judiciary has also shown interest in judicial
evaluation. Under the auspices of a Judicial Conference
Subcommittee on Judicial Evaluation, the U.S. District for the
Central District of Illinois recently completed a pilot evaluation
project involving the voluntary participation of judges and
attorneys. The report on this pilot project states that 'the
response of participants was overwhelmingly positive.' In
addition, the Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals
have used performance evaluation in making retention decisions
for bankruptcy judges and magistrates. Finally, it is also worth
noting that Congress has expressed its concerns about current
arrangements relating to discipline and removal of federal judges
by creating the blue-ribbon National Commission on Judicial
Discipline and Removal, scheduled to complete its work in 1993.
"Within the state administrative judiciary, there is
considerable use of performance evaluation. All but 4 of the 18
states (plus New York City) that have adopted the 'central panel'
model of agency adjudication (whereby some or all state ALJs
are located in a central organization to be assigned to agency
cases on an as-needed basis)( n1 272) use at least the normal type
of civil service evaluation. Eight states (plus New York City)
7 (n. 1267) Keilitz and McBride, Judicial Performance Evaluation Comes of Age, State
Court J., Winter 1992, 4-5. The six states with established programs are AK, CO, CT, IL, NJ and
UT. The eight states developing such programs are AZ, DE, HA, MD, MN, NM, ND and WA. See
also, Feigenbaum, "Statewide Judicial Performance Evaluations: How New Jersey Judges the
Judges," Innovations (National Center for the Courts), 1984.
8 (n.1272) The 18 states are CA, CO, FL, HA, IA, MD, MA, MN, MO, NJ, NC, ND, PA,
TN, TX, WA, Wl and WY. Information supplied by Tracey Brown, Editor, The Central Panel,
Lutherville, MD (401) 321-3993. (Editor's Note: South Carolina and South Dakota began
operating in 1994.)
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submitted to the Conference specially-tailored performance
appraisal forms for their judges and one state (Maryland)
submitted its proposed plan.9(n2 7 3)
"Perhaps the most sophisticated program is New
Jersey's. The New Jersey Office of Administrative Law has
developed an evaluation system designed to reflect performance
of ALJs, to indicate the need for improvement, and also to assist
in the Governor's reappointment decisions.
"The system focuses on three areas of judicial
performance: competence, conduct, and productivity, and uses
a combination of evaluation techniques for assessing an ALJ's
performance.
"The evaluation of an ALJ's competence in New Jersey is
measuredprimarily on the judge's written decisions which are reviewed
by the Director. Decisions reflective of the judge's major subject
matter are randomly selected and are reviewed for factors such as
structure, and substance, including: clarity, proper differentiation of
significant and insignificant fact, proper consideration of statutory,
regulatory, and constitutional principles.
"The conduct of an ALJ is assessed primarily through
the use of case-specific questionnaires to counsel and parties
on a random basis. There are separate questionnaires for
attorneys, pro se litigants, other litigants, and state agencies.
The attorney questionnaires are quite technical and relate to
substantive legal issues as well as settlement skills. The party
questionnaires are less technical and relate more to the judge's
conduct of the hearing and ability to explain the process to the
litigant. The agency's questionnaire is mainly concerned with
the judge's written decision but also includes topics such as the
judge's compliance with timeframes.
"The third area of evaluation is concerned with how the
ALJ handles his or her caseload. Computers are used to
generate reports which present average time per case, average
time from the judge's receipt of the file to the issuance of a
decision, and other administrative timing matters. After all of
the above data is gathered, each judge is afforded an opportunity
to review the information collected. The Office formerly used
four performance levels (marginal, acceptable, commendable
and distinguished), but eliminated these ratings when it stopped
9 (n.1273) The eight states submitting appraisal forms were CO, FL, MN, NJ, ND, TN, WA and Wl.
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using evaluations for salary review. Now the ALJ is simply
provided with the summary results of the evaluation.
"In general the evaluation criteria in the state central
panels concentrate on three main areas: (1) the ability to
preside over hearings both in terms of conducting orderly,
speedy hearings and in terms applying principles of law and
appropriate procedures (2) adequacy of decision making ° and(3) interpersonal relations with staff and caseload management.
In most states, the chief ALJ or panel director does the evaluating
(although Idaho, Oregon and Washington have a unique
arrangement of evaluating each other's ALJs). In some states,
the purpose of the evaluation (beyond meeting usual civil service
requirements) is not explained, although several states explicitly
use such evaluations for counseling, training, reassignment,
advancement, and even salary adjustments." (Some footnotes
omitted.)
C. ACUS REPORT
The ACUS Report recommended that each agency appoint a Chief ALJ who
would:
"a. Develop case processing guidelines with the participation of ALJs,
agency officials, and advisory groups, and subject to the oversight
and approval of OPM.
"b. Collect and maintain data on individual ALJ performance based upon
those guidelines and on adherence to agency rules and substantive
policies.
"c. Conduct performance appraisals on ALJs based on those case
processing guidelines and adherence to agency rules and substantive
policies, at appropriate intervals.
"d. Recommend commendations and awards for superior performance.
"e. Undertake counseling, training or other ameliorative activities with
respect to an ALJs performance.
"f. Receive complaints from ALJs about undue agency pressure or
infringement on decisional independence, determine such complaints
10 Cf. SSA v. Anyel, MSPB Docket No. CB752191010009T1, Opinion and Order dated June 25, 1993
(discipline action against federal ALJ can be based on adjudicatory error).
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are meritorious and take appropriate steps to resolve meritorious
complaints and
"g. Issue reprimands, or recommend that the agency bring formal charges
for good cause, against individualALJs before the MSPB. In agencies
with numerous ALJs, the Chief ALJ may wish to establish peer re view
groups to provide advice on whether to bring such charges."
D. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW SECTION
No action has been taken on the ACUS Report and none is expected at
present. However, in response to that Report, the Administrative Law Section of the
ABA initiated a study of various recommendations in the Report, including the section
on performance evaluations. The February 1993 FALJ newsletter reported theAdLaw
Section deliberations and included a copy of my memorandum pointing out that
evaluations for the ALJs are neither warranted nor appropriate.
"ALJ evaluation by the agency is prohibited by the APA
and appropriately so. Such evaluations, particularly when tied
to "compliance with agency policy" and separated from "good
cause" discipline before an impartial adjudicator is an invitation
to agency coercion-subtle or not-so-subtle-of ALJ
independence. Lack of evaluation for ALJs was not a legislative
oversight but a specific recognition by the Congress of the
pernicious potential of such evaluations as long as ALJs remain
agency employees charged with protecting the public from the
enforcement and regulatory modes of the agency itself and
ensuring fair adjudicatory proceedings.
"Judicial evaluation has been the subject of extensive
study-both within and outside of the ABA. The JAD Committee
on the Evaluation of Judicial Performance has considered the
nature and efficacy of judicial evaluation and has never suggested
that the statutory mandate against agency evaluation of ALJs
should be reversed. The ACUS draft report reflected little
awareness of the extensive literature or legislative history on
this subject. Its conclusion supporting agency evaluation of
ALJs was reached without substantial study or consideration
and without any mandate from the OPM contract. Indeed the
references to evaluation of state and federal judges and to state
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ALJs were included in the final report (pp. 161-63) as an
afterthought following criticism of the lack of any substance to
the report's recommendations in this regard.
"While the final report now notes correctly that many of
the states have evaluations of their general-jurisdiction and
administrative law judges, the evaluations of the general-
jurisdiction judges are commonly in connection with retention
elections-a system which the ABA has long denounced as
improper for judicial selection. (The ABA has also specifically
rejected proposals for term appointments for ALJs. See ABA
Report of Board of Governors (1979).) The evaluation of state
'administrative law judges' must be considered on a case-by-
case basis, because many of these Judges'do not have protected
decisional independence and are not truly judges; on the other
hand, many of these judges are in central panels separate from
the agencies whose cases they hear. None of these systems
present an analog to the federal system where the ALJs work in
the agencies whose cases they hear and hence must be protected
from evaluation, coercion, reward and punishment by those
agencies.
"Finally, the JAD Committee on Judicial Evaluation has
previously recognized that the most appropriate modality for
judicial evaluation is development evaluation rather than the
judgmental evaluation mode suggested by the ACUS report.
Developmental evaluation permits confidential feedback to the
judge from participants in the judge's proceedings in order to
permit the judge to self-improve without threat to judicial
independence. Similarly, the ABA Guidelines for the Evaluation
of Judicial Performance (1985), p. iii, recognize that 'the single
key goal of judicial performance evaluations [is] judicial self-
improvement'-not discipline. 'These are Guidelines for an
evaluation process, not principles to be invoked to discipline a
particular judge.' (Emphasis in original.) The use of such
guidelines for self improvement by individual judges is also
endorsed by OPM in the Administrative Law Judge Program
Handbook (May 1989), p. 18."
The ACUS report appeared to be unaware of most of this information, perhaps
because its efforts were not focused on the subject of judicial evaluation, but on the
subject of judicial selection and rationalizing AU use by the agencies. As I noted in my
memorandum:
"3. The primary reason asserted for the need for
evaluations is to provide a basis for agency discipline against
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judges. No basis for the need for discipline beyond that presently
available under the APA is demonstrated in the report. The APA
permits discipline upon a showing of 'good cause.' What alternate
standard does the report assume orpropose-'no cause'or 'spurious
cause'? The ALJ's work is public and widely known. It is reviewable
and reversible by the agency or on judicial review. The judge is
subject to peer counseling and pressure from fellow judges and from
the chief judge. Judges are formally or informally subject to the Code
of Judicial Conduct and to discipline for 'good cause' shown before
the Merit System Protection Board. There is no dearth of such cases;
there have been 22 such cases in the last ten years (nearly all
involving SSA)-compared with eight cases in the previous 35 years.
The burden of demonstrating the need for more is appropriately on the
proponent-which should be required to document a need and the
efficacy of a proposed solution. The ACUS report does neither."
Nevertheless, the Ad Law Section Adjudication Committee approved a
proposal which provided that:
"1. Some form of periodic review of the performance of
administrative law judges (ALJs) employed by Federal
agencies should be conducted on a regular basis.
"2. Chief administrative law judges employed by Federal
agencies should be given the authority and resources to
develop and oversee a training and counseling program,
designed to enhance professional capabilities and to improve
individual performance.
"3. Chief ALJs employed by Federal agencies should be given
the authority and resources to coordinate the development
of case processing guidelines, with the participation of other
agency ALJs."
The Adjudication Committee report stated that:
"Case processing guidelines can be useful tools in
reviewing ALJ performance. This recommendation urges a peer
approach in developing such guidelines, tailored to the agency's
caseload. Chief ALJs should be authorized to coordinate this
effort in each agency with the participation of the other ALJs in
the agency."
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All the ALJs on the Adjudication Committee (and one of the other members),
totaling a majority of the participating committee members, filed a strong dissent to that
recommendation:
"The Administrative Procedure Act was carefully crafted
to assure that administrative law judges are truly neutral hearing
officers who have decisional independence. If ALJs become
subject to performance reviews conducted by agency
supervisors, their requisite decisional independence and
neutrality would be eroded and compromised.
"The 'case processing guidelines,'contemplated by the
recommendation, have not been shown to be necessary or
practicable. Statutory provisions and agency rules of practice
already exist to require 'speedy' hearings and expedited case
dispositions where appropriate and needed. The development
of these additional case processing guidelines is unwarranted
and could lead to numerical quotas stressing quantity over
quality in case management and decision writing."
Nevertheless, the Ad Law Section adopted those proposals essentially as
stated by the Adjudication Committee. In adopting that recommendation, the Ad Law
Section noted:
"In 1979 the ABA supported legislation which would
'create a system of periodic performance evaluations [of ALJs]
by an Administrator outside the employing agency, under
standards of performance to be promulgatedby the Administrator
with the approval of a review board composed of a majority of
ALJs and others, but no individuals from the agency that employs
the AL under review or who regularly litigate before that agency.
"Recommendation 92-7 of the Administrative Conference
of the United States, 1 CFR § 305.92-7 (1993), also proposes
legislation to create a system of performance review for ALJs
employed by Federal agencies, but proposes that Chief ALJs in
each agency be given the authority to undertake the reviews
(and to develop training programs and use peer review to
provide guidance to individual judges and develop case-
processing guidelines).
"This recommendation reiterates the basic principle
embodied in the ABA's 1979 recommendation-that some form
of periodic review of ALJ performance be instituted. Although
nearly all other Federal executive branch employees are covered
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by the civil service performance appraisal system (and members of
the Senior Executive Service are now covered by a special tailored
system of 'recertification,' which took effect in 1992), ALJs are
exempted from the system [ U.S. C. § 4301 (2)(D). Agencies may seek
removal or discipline of ALJs, 'for good cause,' but only by initiating
a formal proceeding at the Merit Systems Protection Board, and the
Board has applied standards that have limited the contexts in which
such actions may successfully be taken against an ALJ. For example,
while misconduct cases have been successfully brought before the
Board, agency actions premised on low productivity have not been
successful.
"This recommendation does not specify what procedure
should be used for conducting the evaluations except to provide
that they be conducted on a regular basis. The recommendation
does, however, recognize the importance of agency Chief ALJs
in undertaking the developmental responsibilities that relate to
performance evaluations such as training and counseling.
Indeed, as the ABA has already recognized in its guidelines for
evaluation of judicial performance:
"'Self-improvement should be the primary use of judicial
performance evaluation.' (Guideline .I, ABA Guidelines for the
Evaluation of Judicial Performance, August 1985.) In addition,
however, it is also appropriate that evaluations be available for
management purposes."
In my article in the NCALJ Administrative Judiciary News & Journal (Winter
1994) I noted that:
"The case processing and evaluation proposals of the
ABA Ad Law Section are especially troubling . . . , since they
do not seem to appreciate the rationale of the APA in prohibiting
evaluations by an agency or agency employees as a necessary
ingredient of decisional independence."
Following objection by NCALJ and the Judicial Administration Division, the Ad
Law Section withdrew the proposal from consideration by the ABA House of Delegates
at that time. Subsequent negotiations led the Ad Law Section to drop the provision
concerning case processing guidelines, but they retained the restatement of the ABA
position supporting evaluations and references in the accompanying report to the GAO
Study and the Gender Bias Task Force Report:
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"It is important to the legitimacy of any system of
adjudication that both the reality and appearance of any bias,
prejudice, or misconduct by adjudicators be avoided. Allegations
of bias or other misconduct on the part of a federal administrative
law judge are rare and infrequent, but they do occur. See e.g.,
U.S. Government Accounting Office, Social Security: Racial
Differences in Disability Decisions Warrants Further
Investigation, GAO/HRD-92-56 (April 1992): Ninth Circuit Gender
Bias Task Force Preliminary Report (Discussion Draft) (July
1992 at 93-103 (discussing gender bias issues relating to
disability benefits determinations)."
In reference to that Ad Law proposal, I submitted a memo to JAD
stating:
"2. The provisions concerning evaluations in the proposal
contain nothing beyond currently stated ABA policy; and nothing
in the report warrants a reiteration of that ABA position. Citation
to the GAO study and the Gender Bias Task Force preliminary
report is particularly troubling, since nothing in them supports
what they are habitually cited for, and they provide no basis for
an alleged need for evaluation."
At the February midyear meeting NCALJ voted not to acquiesce in the Ad Law
proposal. During its Spring meeting at Amelia Island in May, 1994 the Ad Law Section
modified its proposal to provide:
"1. Reviews of the performance of administrative law judges
should be conducted outside the employing agency on the
basis of peer review.
2. The chief administrative lawjudge of each employing agency
should be given the authority and resources to develop and
oversee programs, designed to enhance professional
capabilities and to improve performance of administrative
law judges in that agency."
Paragraph I reflected a step back from the current ABA policy calling for
"periodic" review and a step forward calling for "peer review," but it raised the specter
of a further ABA pronouncement calling for an amendment of the APA to require
evaluations of the ALJs. Paragraph 2 raised concern among some judges as providing
a basis for the Chief Judge to participate in "improving performance" of ALJs and thereby
inferentially measuring that performance. In late July the Ad Law Section agreed to
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remove paragraphs 1 and 2 from its proposal before the ABA House of Delegates in an
effort to avoid a floor fight over the other provisions of its resolution. The Ad Law Section
also deleted the objectionable references to the GAO Report and the Gender Bias
Report. This matter is still alive, and if you are concerned about it contact me (401
Seventh Street SW, Suite 5100, Washington, DC 20590, Phone: 202/366-2137, Fax: 202/
366-7536).
E. ALJ CORPS
The pending AU Corps Bill, "The Reorganization of the Federal Administrative
Judiciary," appears to retain the current provisions exempting ALJs from performance
appraisals under Title 5. See Sec. 7(a) (5) which appears to continue the current
reference to 4301(2)(D). On the other hand, that bill provides that the Council of the
Corps "shall adopt and issue rules of judicial conduct for administrative law judges,"
which
"shall be enforced by the Council and shall include standards
governing-
"(1) judicial conduct and extra-judicial activities to avoid actual,
or the appearance of, improprieties or conflicts or interest;
"(2) the performance of judicial duties impartially and diligently;
"(3) avoidance of bias or prejudice with respect to all parties; and
"(4) efficiency and management of cases so as to reduce
dilatory practices and unnecessary costs." S. 486, § 599e(b)
(emphasis added).
In explaining these provisions, their sponsor Senator Cohen stated that
"My amendment would strengthen the provisions governing
the removal and discipline of ALJ's and establish a fair and open
process for taking disciplinary actions against ALJ's. My amendment
requires that the Council of the ALJ Corps must adopt and issue rules
ofjudicial conduct for administrative lawjudges. This code of conduct
will include standards which govern the judicial conduct and
extrajudicial activities ofALJs and should be designed to avoid actual,
or the appearance of, improprieties or conflicts of interest, as well as
bias or prejudice with respect to all parties, and to ensure the impartial
and diligent performance ofjudicialduties and the efficientmanagement
of cases. The Council will be responsible for enforcing the code of
conduct.
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Finally, the bill also provides for appropriate and fair
discipline, and in some instances, removal of ALJ's; for enhanced
training of AL's; and for greater accountability of AL's to their
supervisors." Congressional Record, S16564, 516565
(November 19, 1993).
These provisions may provide a basis for evaluations by the Chief Judge
of the Division within the Corps. In any event the adoption of a AU Corps bill
would vitiate many of the arguments traditionally used in resisting performance
evaluations for ALJs. And the presence of State Central Panels as a template for the
Corps Bill may provide further impetus toward evaluation of federal ALJs.
F. WHERE ARE WE GOING?
The pressure toward public complaint procedures and evaluation of all
government employees is strong, and it would be imprudent for ALJs to fail to consider
developing their own proposals concerning complaints and evaluations. One such
proposal for complaints is contained in the AU Corps bill, which would create a peer
review Board to determine whether complaints merit further action. But that bill has not
passed despite a decade of trying-and we have recently seen indications that the
Clinton Administration, like those before it, will not support the bill. The ABA JAD
Committee on Judicial Evaluation endorses evaluation for self-improvement (i.e.,
developmental, not judgmental, evaluation), and that approach has been adopted in the
Illinois state courts and the federal court system.
As I noted in the NCALJ Administrative Judiciary News and Journal:
"The message is clear: Like the Code of Conduct 10 years
ago: If we don't do it ourselves, someone is apt to do it for us (to us)
in a way we will doubtless like less. The time for us to address these
questions-at least within our own groups-is now."
G. JUDICIAL EVALUATION COMMITTEE
Consequently, I have appointed a new committee of NCALJ on Judicial
Evaluation to study the current situation among state ALJs and central panels, as well
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as the state and federal judiciary. The Committee will be chaired by one of our most
respected scholar lawyers, Terry Miller; with Melanie Vaughn as vice-chair; and two of
our non-NCALJ ALJs have agreed to assist: Jerry Nelson who teaches professional
responsibility at the American University Law School and Jim Timony, who recently
completed an article entitled "Performance Evaluation For Federal Administrative Law
Judges" for the American University Administrative Law Journal 7 A.U. Ad L.J. 629
(Fall/Winter 1993-94).
The ALJ community continues to watch the fallout from the ACUS study of the
federal administrative judiciary and the recommendations of the Administrative Law
Section for the selection and evaluation of ALJs. One of the apparent lessons of that
experience is that all federal administrative law judges must seek to be as active as
possible in the ABA and the Ad Law Section-several of the critical votes within the Ad
Law Adjudication Committee were won or lost on the strength of a single vote. Every
judge should join and participate in the Ad Law Section as well as NCALJ.
We are still being outgunned on many fronts. If all administrative law judges
in NAALJ, FALJC and the SSA ALJ Association were active members of the ABA and
the Administrative Law Section as well as NCALJ, it would dramatically change the
chemistry of those organizations. Active participation in all of those organizations is
costly in many ways-time, money, and frustration-but that job is important and
necessary; and I still believe that our job is the best there is. Moreover, with the recent
pay increases it is increasingly difficult to plead poverty, and increasingly necessary to
see the expense of active involvement as a necessary investment in our business-
providing fair and impartial judging to the agency and the public alike.
Journal of the National
Association of Administrative Law Judges
National Association of
Administrative Law Judges
c/o National Center for the State Courts
300 Newport Avenue, Williamsburg, VA 23187-8798
Membership Application and Questionnaire
Please answer questions in full. Type or print.
1) Name:
(last) (first) (m.i.)
2) Home address
(street) (apt.)
3) Home phone Work Phone:
4) Title (ALJ,
Hearing Officer,
etc.)
5) Name of agency
(in full):
6) Business
address:
(street)
(city) (state) (zip)
7) Please send my
mail to: Home Work
8) Date of birth:
9) Are you an attorney at law? Yes No
10) My present Appointed for Appointed for in
position is: Elected__ fixed term definite term
Competitive Other (explain
Civil Service
11) My position is: Full-time __ Part-time __ Per Diem
12) Year service began
13) Brief Description of job duties.
14) Academic degrees with year awarded
15) Awards, honors, etc.; Other affiliations (optional)
16) Optional and confidential: for use by The Committee on Compensation Of
Administration Law Judges and Hearing Officers.
Salary (or salary range) for your present position:
$ per
Civil Service Appointeing
Salary fixed by: Statute __ Board __ Authority__
Collective Other (explain
Bargaining -
17) - I am now a memer of this association. (I previously joined NAALJ
or its predecessor, NAAHO).
18) I am a new member.
19) Signature
Date:
Please photocopy, fill out and mail with your check for $35.00
